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PRORATION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTION
PETROLEUM proration consists of an extensive system of interlocking state
and federal regulations developed during the last fifteen years ostensibly as a
program of petroleum conservation, actually as a means of pegging the price
of oil.' The chief weapon of proration policy - employed in a bewildering
1. For a general description of proration and the petroleum industry, see Marshall
and Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 33, Legal
Planning of Petroleum Production: Two Years of Proration (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 702;
Ely, The Conservation of Oil (1938) 51 HARD. L. REV. 1209; Ford, Controlling the
Production of Oil (1932) 30 MICH. L. REv. 1170; NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEF,
ENERGY RESOURCES AND NATIONAL PoLICY (1939) 123-236, 397-404; KEMNiTzER, RE-
BIRTH OF IONOPOLY (1938); LOGAN, STABILIZATION OF THE OIL INDUSTRY (1926);
POGUE, ECONOMICS OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1939); SHUMAN, THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY (1940); STOCKING, THE OIL INDUSTRY AND THE COMPETITIVE SYSTEM (1925);
WATKINS, OIL: STABILIZATION OR CONSERVATION? (1937).
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variety of ways- is limitation of output; rather than direct price fixing.
Within recent years the outlines of the oil production control policy have taken
on the clarity of accepted usage, and the consequences of the program are now
to be observed and measured, rather than predicted. Moreover, the scheme
of oil proration must be re-examined in the light of the war effort, which
is bringing sharp increases in demand and changing patterns of oil con-
sumption.
OIL PRODUCTION: GEOLOGY AND EcoxmOiics
Oil is found in vast reservoirs which usually underlie a multitude of small,
independently owned, contiguous surface tracts. The typical reservoir con-
tains a layer of free gas in its higher portions, a stratum of water at its
base, and a pool of oil compressed between the water and the gas. The free
gas and the underlying water exert a constant pressure throughout the pool,
which produces a constant diffusion of gas into the oil itself, reducing the
viscosity of the oil and increasing its mobility. So long as the reservoir
remains untapped by wells it lies in a state of equilibrium. unce its shell
is punctured by drilling, the pressure gradients combine to propel the oil
toward the aperture and lift it to the surface. Since gas and water tend
to move toward any area of reduced pressure more rapidly than oil, the gas
and water in the pool, as the rate of withdrawal of oil is unduly increased,
tend to by-pass the remaining oil, encircle it, and prevent its production.
.Moreover, as the pressure of the free gas and the water is reduced, the
quantity of gas dissolved in the oil decreases and the mobility of the oil
declines. It is therefore essential in order to secure maximum ultimate re-
covery that pressure not be drawn off too rapidly from the pool as a whole
and from localized areas. There exists an optinal rate of production for
each pool and for each well tapping the pool, which, if adhered to by well
owners, will prevent waste of natural reservoir energy and conversely pro-
mote economy in production through superior efficiency.2 Yet in the past
the optimal rate has been uniformly ignored by oil producers. Production
in each oil field has been meteoric. An initial "flush" production, character-
ized by an enormous output and an indiscriminate utilization of natural
reservoir pressure, has been followed by a rapid decline and tapering off
of the field's productive capacity; in place of the once abundant naturd
reservoir pressures, the use of costly artificial repressuring devices has been
necessitated to maintain even a reduced output.3
At the basis of this rapacious and wasteful exploitation of oil fields is tile
economic motivation of each producer to expand production as rapidly as
2. The optimal rate of production must clearly be differentiated from the efficient
oil-gas ratio. The latter is purely a mechanical concept which has no relation to economy.
The optimal rate is discussed further infra at p. 624.
3. See VATM Ns, op. cit. supra note 1, at 13-17; PrrE.'GUL, Hot OIL k1936) 62.
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possible in order to secure a larger share of the oil from the pool tapped
by his wells. Ownership of oil in a pool is not determined by the boundaries
of the overlying surface properties but, under the judicially sanctioned rule
of capture, 4 the first producers to reduce any part or all of the oil to physical
possession take title to it, regardless of the fact that it may have been drained
from a portion of the pool underlying the surface tracts of neighboring pro-
ducers. Each owner of oil-bearing properties, therefore, necessarily pursues
a vicious program of offset drilling and unthrottled production.
In the past output has not been inevitably reduced even by a disastrous
fall in price.5 The owner of a given well could not easily cease operations,
so long as his neighbors continued to produce, without risking the loss of
all possible future production. The economic difficulties which the situation
presented for the individual producer frequently resulted from a depression
in the crude price level originating in the peculiar pattern of oil production
itself. Not only did cumulative acceleration in output, inherent in a super-
imposition of the law of capture upon a divided ownership of surface land,
often cause a perceptible fall in petroleum prices but violent downswings
were occasioned by the periodic discovery of new flush oil fields.0 The low
unit operating costs in flush fields, moreover, permitted the price of crude
to fall below the unit operating costs of many of the producers in older fields,
who, having already fully utilized the mainspring of the natural reservoir
pressure of the pools, had been forced to resort to costly artificial pumping.
From the beginning producers evinced more consternation over the low
prices resulting from unregulated oil production in general, and from the
periodic discovery of flush fields in particular, than over the waste of reservoir
energy. As long, however, as output was inadequate in the long run to meet
the demand for oil, all attempts to regulate production were defeated. But
when output began to increase faster than demand, and finally definitely out-
distanced demand, relief was actively sought in the proration mechanism. 7
Two procedures for restricting supply by means of proration are in use today:
4. The rule of capture has at various times been given three different meanings. In
its broadest sense it denotes a condition in which there is no regulation of oil production
by any agency, private or governmental. In a strictly legal sense it means a rule of law
whereby the operator of one tract of land is permitted to withdraw with impunity oil
underlying neighboring tracts. Less frequently it is used as the antithesis of "ownership
of oil in place." See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Comnmilee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 290. and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 1479-
80. Here the term is employed in its strictly legal sense.
5. See NATIONAL REsoURCES CommrTzz, op. cit. supra note 1, at 192.
6. The most serious price declines were caused by the discovery of the Seminole
field in Oklahoma in 1927 and the discovery of the East Texas field in 1931. See ibid.
7. The best example is provided by Oklahoma which had a statute on its books,
permitting restriction of supply, as early as 1915. No attempt was made to use it until
the petroleum output, augmented by production from the newly discovered Seminole
field, began to outrun the demands for crude. See Marshall and Meyers, supra note 1,
42 YALE L. J. at 702, n. 2; KEMNITZER, op. cit. supro note 1, at 54.
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(1) enforced curtailment of production by proration under state laws; and
(2) voluntary curtailment by proration under a cooperative agreement of
producers.
CONTROL OF PRoDucTIoN
(1) Enforced Curtaihncnt by Proration Under State Law. State laws for
the conservation of oil resources have been enacted in all but two important
producing states.s The typical statute provides for the establishment of a
state conservation agency to enforce the prohibition of specifically enumerated
wastes.9 No reference is made to the federal-state scheme of proration in
any of the statutes; but the state agencies, once constituted, have uniformly
adopted the mechanism, finding authority, under a statutory prohibition either
of economic waste or of waste resulting from a market supply in excess of
consumptive demand.10
Control of production through proration begins at the United States Bureau
of Mines which forecasts the monthly demand for crude oil from each state.
The first step in the forecasts is an estimate of total national gasoline demand,
based on the number of automobiles in operation throughout the country and
the average gasoline consumption per automobile. From this total is deducted
the gasoline to be obtained from storage, from imports, or from natural
production." The balance is the gasoline to be produced from crude oil.
An estimated yield factor, based on the average crude oil requirement per
unit of gasoline processed, is applied to this balance to determine the total
national crude oil demand. It is arbitrarily assumed that the national crude
oil demand is unaffected by the demand for fuel oil and that whatever residue
is left after processing total national crude for gasoline will satisfy the con-
sumptive demand for fuel oil. Having determined the national petroleum
demand, the Bureau of Mines distributes this total among the oil producing
states according to past demands for the crude oil of each state. The country
is divided into eight refinery districts and reports are secured from each
district of its past receipts of crude oil from each state for refining. These
amounts are checked with interstate movements of oil to discover any trend
in the demand upon a particular state. For example, it may happen that
S. Illinois and California have held out against persistent pressure from neighbor-
ing oil producing states. This has not, however, detracted seriously from the effective-
ness of the proration mechanism since California has a voluntary system of curtailment
and since Illinois produces a low percentage of the country's crude output-for e-am-
ple, 7.5% in 1939. See MiNER~A~LS YEArEno (U. S. Dep't Interior 1940) 954.
9. See Ford, supra note 1, at 1181; Comment (1939) 25 VA. L R-v. 360, 365, n. 44.
10. See Marshall and Meyers, supra note 1, 42 Y.M L. J. at 727; Hearings bcfore
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commercc on H. R. 290
and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 956-10K.
11. "Natural production" denotes liquid gasoline extracted directly from natural gas
by purely physical methods.
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a refinery district is increasing its purchases of oil from one stale and reduc-
ing them elsewhere. After allowances are made for any such trend the
adjusted receipts of oil from each state by all refinery districts are added to
determine the total demand on that state.
12
The forecast of demand for crude from each state is communicated to the
state's conservation agency for use in setting the state's allowable production
for the ensuing month. The estimated demand differs from the allowable
production because, during the month, oil may be withdrawn from storage
by refiners to satisfy current needs or, on the other hand, purchases in excess
of immediate needs may be indulged to add to the total surface stock of
crude oil. To check the possibility of such changes in the crude oil stock,
the state agency secures nominations from buyers of oil within the state as
to prospective purchases. On the basis of these nominations and the esti-
mated fluctuations in crude oil storage, it sets the allowable production for
the state, which is in turn allocated to the various fields and wells within
the state." No satisfactory formula for the allocation hag yet been worked
out by any agency. There are hundreds of factors which should be con-
sidered. 14 The ideal as enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States
would give each operator an opportunity to produce substantially the amount
of oil and gas under his tract, subject always to the necessity of preventing
waste.15 The efforts of the conservation agencies to realize this ideal are
evidenced by the variety of formulae in use among the oil producing states.
In general, the state's allowable has been distributed on a per well basis,
without reference to the estimated oil reserve underlying each well.10 This
policy has frequently been a consequence of the indiscriminate extension of
the benefit of marginal well statutes to all types of wells.' 7 But the Supreme
Court of the United States has in effect held that the due process clause
12. The procedure used by the Bureau of Mines is described in detail in Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstatc and Foreign Commerce on H. R.
290 and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 167-94; Hearings before the Temporary
National Economic Committee on Public Res. 113, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939) 9583-
9603.
13. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce on H. R. 290 and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 1487-92.
14. The geological characteristics of the pool, the number of wells on its structure,
its cost of operation, and its nearness to market are only a few. See ibid.
15. See note 94 infra.
16. See POGuE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 26. Other methods which may be used inde-
pendently or in connection with a per well measure are potential production and acreage.
See Ely, supra note 1, at 1226.
17. Statutes prevent any restriction of the production of marginal wells below a
certain minimum.. The extension of the benefit of these statutes to all types of wells has
been most notorious in Texas. In 1940, for example, although well quotas were theoret-
ically measured on a potential production basis, actually 75% of the state's allowable was
distributed on a per well basis. See Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols
Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570, 574 (1941).
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of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no restrictions upon the state agency
in its choice of a production allocation formula.18
In order to enforce the restriction of production by each well owner to
his pro rata share, the states have set up rigid penal systems. Oil pruduced
in excess of quotas is subject to confiscation. 1 State tender boards require
regular reports from oil producers and pipe lines on the quantity of oil
shipped.2 0 The state systems are powerfully bulwarked by a federal penal
statute. Under the Connally Act it has become unlawful for any producer
to ship in interstate commerce oil produced in excess of his individual quota
under state law.21 A Federal Tender Board has been set up to enforce the
Act, being granted investigatory powers similar to those of the state boards. "
An overall supervision of the proration mechanism is exercised by the
Interstate Oil Compact Commission, a voluntary cooperative committee of
representatives from the oil producing states.m The compact providing for
the Commission has been specifically approved by Congress.24 The provisions
of the compact encourage the prevention of physical waste but expressly pro-
hibit the Commission from engaging in price stabilization and monopolistic
practices.25 In the past membership of the Commission has been limited in
number and, although regular meetings have been held, little has been done
to prevent physical waste. Recently, under the impact of mounting interest
in federal control of oil production, the Commission has shown new activity
in the conservation field.26
18. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573
(1940), amended, 311 U. S. 614 (1940); id., 311 U. S. 570 (1941), Note (1942) 51 YAt.z
L. J. 680.
19. The Texas statute is typical. See TEx. A.N. RFv. Civ. STr. tVernun, 1935),
art. 6066a, § 10; Thompson v. Spear, 91 F. (2d) 430 (C. C. A. Ath, 1937), ¢crl. dcnied.
302 U. S. 762 (1937).
20. These measures, even in the absence of specific statutory authorization, have
been judicially sanctioned as reasonable police poower regulations. Atlas Pipe Line Co.
v. Sterling, 4 F. Supp. 441 (E. D. Tex. 1933).
21. For the text of the Connally Act. see 49 ST.T. 30 (19351 . reenacted by 50 ST,,T.
257 (1937) and 53 STAT. 927 (1939), 15 U. S. C. §715 (1940).
22. See 49 STAT. 31 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 715d (1940). Actually the BLoard has thus
far confined its activities to the East Texas field. See Hearings before a Sucoinn-ittee
of the Committee on Intcrstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 1302, H. R. 4517, and H. R.
2308, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 122-29.
23. See Comment, Some Legal and Practical Problems of the Interstate Coinetia
(1935) 45 YALE L. 3. 324, 332.
24. For the text of the Compact, see 49 ST.T. 939 (1935), reenacted by 50 STAT.
617 (1937) and 53 STAT. 1071 (1939).
25. Id. at art. 5.
26. The membership has been enlarged. Federal governmental agencies have been
invited to participate in the meetings. Expenses are paid by pro rata contributions from
all member states rather than, as was formerly true, by Oklahoma alone. Conunittees
have been set up to study various legal and engineering aspects of oil pr4duction and a
uniform conservation statute has been devised. See Hearings before a Suobconamittee of
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 290 and H. R. 15 and
H. R. MS, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 41-75.
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(2) Voluntary Curtailment by Proration Under a Cooperative Agreement
Between Producers. Curtailment of production in California functions extra-
legally through the Central Committee of California Oil Producers, an organ-
ization whose membership includes most of the producers of the state. The
Committee fixes an allowable production for the state, based on purchasers'
nominations and on the Bureau of Mines' quota for California, and distributes
this allowable on a potential production measure among the wells in each
field.
27
Although California became a member of the Interstate Oil Compact Com-
mission in 1939, it has failed to adopt an Qil conservation statute.28 There
are, accordingly, no state and federal policing regulations, 20 and conformance
to assigned quotas depends entirely upon whatever sanctions the Central
Committee can invoke against non-cooperative producers. 0 In all respects
other than enforcement, however, the mechanics of restriction are the same
as those of states sanctioning proration by statute.
DIAGNOSIS OF PRORATION
Before the general adoption of the proration scheme, the vagaries of the
law of real property as applied to the geology of oil fields resulted in a
pattern of production which offended many interests. The divided ownership
of the land over oil pools made production less responsive than otherwise to
declining price; yet the producer was recurringly confronted with a depres-
sion of price upon the periodic coming into production of new fields. More-
over, in direct contravention of the interest of the public, maximum total oil
recovery was not the goal pursued by producers: much gas and water pressure
which might have been utilized in the long run to lift oil to the surface was
needlessly dissipated.
The remedy adopted by the oil states and by Congress, the complex pro-
gram of restricting production known as proration, does not eliminate the
structural maladjustments inherent in an unregulated crude oil industry.
Under the system of proration the states have assumed leadership of the
27. For a general discussion, see Hearings before a Subconmittee of the Connmittee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 290 and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1939) 679-788, 1711-17; WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 230.
28. Two attempts have been made. In both instances conservation bills were de-
feated by popular referendum. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on Interstatd and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 290 and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1939) 1711.
29. The Connally Act operates only in those states which have conservation statutes
designed to restrict supply. See 49 STAT. 31 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 715b (1940).
30. The major companies in California have supported proration statutes in prefer-
ence to this system. See SHUMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 269. On the other hand, the
United States Department of Justice recently initiated an antitrust investigation of the
California crude industry. See Department of Justice, Investigation of the Oil Industry
in the Pacific Coast Area (1939).
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multitude of competing oil producers and, through the medium of the Inter-
state Oil Compact Commission and the Bureau of Mines, collaboration be-
tween the new leaders takes place on a national scale. The overall control
engendered by this pyramiding of authority is not, however, utilized to
promote conservation, but rather to rig prices by artificially restricting output
without regard to optimal rates of production of specific fields or of wells
in specific fields. Moreover, while total output is artificially held constant
behind the damming wall erected by proration, producers continue to engage
in a wasteful competitive strife.
In the past there has been stiff competition among states in their roles
as producers. The Bureau of Mines' methods of forecasting demand upon
the basis of past shipments to market have constantly tempted each state
gradually to increase its production in order to obtain a larger share of the
market. But of course upon the adoption of such a policy other states would
be induced promptly to retaliate. Knowledge of this fact has caused larger
producirfg states to adhere closely to their quotas, even in the absence of
interstate agreement. Smaller producing states have tended to deviate often
from quotas upon the well-reasoned theory that large producing states would
rather relinquish a little of their market than abandon the entire control
machinery.31 But the growing effectiveness of the Interstate Oil Compact
Commission in controlling production can be surmised from the remarkable
constancy since 1936 of percentages contributed by each state to total pro-
duction.
32
Although competition among states may now be on the wane, the com-
petitive struggle continues among individual producers within the insulating
barriers set up along state lines. The rule of capture - abolished for pro-
duction -continues to govern well-drilling. It has proved politically im-
possible for any state agency completely to deny any well owner the right
to produce, and, until recently, to deny any surface owner the privilege of
digging a well. A number of states now have well spacing laws.-a A few
31. Illinois has been the chief offender, poaching heavily upon the Chicago market.
States like Oklahoma and Texas which shipped to that area have cut production, appar-
ently reasoning that Illinois' production can have only a limited life. See Hcarings be-
fore a Subcommittee of a Committee on Interstate and Foreign Colnlnerce on H. R.
290 and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 954.
32. See WATmXNs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 109; Hearings before a Subomnmittee of
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 290 and H. R. 7372, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 1710-11 (Table I). The effectiveness of the Interstate Oil Com-
pact Commission is also graphically illustrated by the unanimity of state action in Aug-
ust, 1939, when, within four days after one of the major oil refining companies in the
country announced a reduction in its posted price for crude oil, all wells in six states
were shut down; operations were not renewed until the posted price had resumed its ,d
level. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H. R. 290 and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 534.
33. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Couerce on H. R. 290 and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 351-63.
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have even enacted laws providing for compulsory drilling districts.34 But
the general administration of proration on a per well basis, rather than in
accordance with underlying oil reserves, has stimulated a circular acceleration
of drilling, costly to both producer and community. Since each additional
well increases the total permissible production from the tract on which it
is located, new wells are constantly being drilled. But the quotas of all
the other wells in the field are reduced to prevent a production in excess of
the field allocation. Therefore the owners of other tracts, in self-defense,
must drill new wells to secure their fair share of the underground oil. The
consequent overexpansion of capital investments can only result either in all
owners ending up with their original allotments or in some, by virtue of supe-
rior capital resources, benefiting at the expense of their fellows.30 In either
case the capital invested in the new wells is socially unproductive inasmuch
as total supply is held to a constant. 37 Thus while the multitude of producers
and the ease of entry, characteristic of a competitive economy, continue to
exist under proration, the advantages which normally flow from osuch an
economy in reduced costs, lower prices, and an optimal use of resources have
been blocked by the intervention of the state.
Insofar as the antitrust laws are designed to preserve the advantages of
a competitive economy, their policy has beyond doubt been violated. But
the mechanism of proration is protected from prosecution by an anomalous
type of governmental immunity based on combined practical and legal con-
siderations. Intrastate action under proration statutes may be accorded specific
exemption from state antitrust prosecutions." But even where no specific
exemption is provided, the question of prosecution is practically foreclosed
by the fact that the attorney generals in the states are actively engaged in
enforcing the proration laws. Interstate restraint of production is also, in
practical effect, immunized from prosecution under the federal antitrust laws,
for the reason that all action is taken with express Congressional approval,
Cooperation among the producing states has been made possible by Con-
34. See id. at 1492-94.
35. From 1932 to 1938 there was approximately a 300% increase in the number of
wells in the East Texas field which increased total production only 20%. See Hearings
before the Temporary National Economic Committee on Public Res. 113, 76th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1939) 7598. Attempts to restrict drilling activity by means of spacing rules have
not proved effective. See Ely, supra note 1, at 1230.
36. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce on H. R. 290 and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 330.
37. The overcapitalization will cause producers to seek a higher price for crude. See
Marrs v. City of Oxford, 24 F. (2d) 541, 546 (D. Kan. 1928), aff'd, 32 F. (2d) 134
(C. C. A. 8th, 1929) ; Ely, supra note 1, at 1234. It has been estimated that the cost of
excess drilling is equivalent to a self-imposed gross production tax of tel cents per bar-
rel of oil produced. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of tIhe Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 290 and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 353.
38. California has been most liberal in granting immunity from its antitrust laws.
See CODES OF CALIF. (Deering, 1939) Public Resources Code § 3301.
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gressional ratification of the Interstate Oil Compact; the forecasting service
of the Bureau of Mines is supported by annual federal appropriations;-"
and effective enforcement of state production quotas by the prohibition of
the interstate shipment of "hot oil" is embodied in the thrice reenacted
Connally Act.40
An analysis of the forecasting methods used by the Bureau of 'Mines
demonstrates conclusively that the monopolistic practices of the couperating
states effect a stabilization of crude oil prices.41 Both the Bureau of Mines'
estimates of demand by states and the purchasers' nominations filed with the
state control agency implicitly assume that the size of the market demand
is that which exists at current prices. In this fashion the petroleum price
level is made virtually self-perpetuating. The present level was originally
fixed by the National Industrial Recovery Administration fur the purpose
of continuing in production all wells, regardless of cost 42 After the Schechter
decision,43 other industries to which a similar policy had been applied rein-
stated the fundamental law of economic progress that prices should be deter-
mined by the low cost producers. Yet the price level for crude oil as set
by the Recovery Administration has been maintained with only slight varia-
tions.44 Moreover, the indications are that it will be directly enforced again
by the Federal Government under the developing system of emergency price
control.
45
Prima facie any scheme which stabilizes price at a level to protect the
highest cost producer appears unreasonable and therefore a doubtful exercise
of governmental authority.4" Maintenance of such a level of prices has the
39. This circumvents the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States that
a similar trade service constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act. American Column
and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921).
40. The Connally Act recognizes the existence of potential monopolistic practice3
when it provides for intervention by the President of the United States ups-n the devel-
opment of a disparity between demand and supply. See 49 ST.AT. 31 (1935), 15 U. S. C.
§ 715(c) (1940). As yet the power has never been e'ercised, although it %%as threatened
in the shutdown of August, 1939.
41. The prorationists admit that price is afftcted but claim that such a result is
purely incidental to the conservation of oil. See Hcarinis before a Sudconiflttce of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 200 and I. R. 7372, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 1178, 2U12.
42. NATION AL R covERy ADIINISTRATIOiN, CODE o FAIR COMITnIT1,m.r FoQ THE Pt -
TROLEUM INDUSTRY (1933).
43. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935 1.
44. See Hearings before the Temporary IN\ational Economic Committee on Public
Res. 113, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939) 7449.
45. Letters from the Office of Price Administration have already jL2en sent to all 0,il
producers and purchasers "requesting" that prices as of a designated date he f ll'wed.
(1941) 10 U. S. L. VEEK 2290; (1942) 10 U. S. L. WEEK 2461.
46. Compare Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934); Champlin Refining C#.
v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210 (1932).
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effect of granting a substantial subsidy to the operators of the low-cost wells,
47
and to the refiners who draw on stores of crude oil purchased during pre-
proration years when the price structure of crude was demoralized.48 The
prorationists, however, attempt a justification on principles of conservation.
Four stock-in-trade arguments are advanced: (1) A high price level is
necessary to prevent abandonment of stripper wells 49 and loss of their oil.
(2) A high price level insures the highest possible use value of oil by avoiding
its consumption in satisfaction of low-priced wants. (3) Restriction of pro-
duction conserves reservoir energy so that the ultimate recovery of oil from
the pool is maximized. (4) Restriction of production eliminates wasteful
storage consequent upon a market supply greater than market demand.
The first argument proceeds upon a common confusion of stripper wells
with marginal wells.5" The marginal well is defined as a well whose ratio
of value returns to cost of production is dangerously low. The stripper well
by definition is a well with a low ratio of energy output to energy input.
The former is an economic concept, the latter an efficiency concept. It does
not follow in principle or in practice that because the stripper well has a
low efficiency ratio it also has a low economy ratio, nor that if a high price
is not maintained operation of the stripper wells must shortly be abandoned.61
The argument may have validity for marginal wells. So restricted, however,
it loses its poignancy; while stripper wells constitute about three-fourths
of the total number of wells in the country,5 2 the number of marginal wells
in relation to the total is insignificant. 3 Even when wells are shut in, the
oil is not lost.54 The equipment may deteriorate but the oil is still in the
47. The variations in costs between individual wells are extremely wide. See UNITED
STATES PETROLEUM ADMINISTP ATIVE BOARD, REPORT ON THE COST OF PRODUCING Cnuoi
(1935) 26, 62. The operating costs of pumped wells are about 25% more than the oper-
ating costs of flush wells. See Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Coln-
inittee on Public Res. 113, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939) 8227.
48. For statistics on the accumulations of crude in storage, see KEmNATZER, supra
note 1, at 114.
49. Stripper wells as a class comprise the less efficiently producing wells in the coun-
try. Usually wells which must be artificially pumped fall into this category. They may
be compared with flush wells which are enervated by natural reservoir pressures.
50. The same confusion exists in the granting of minimum allowances to stripper
wells under marginal well statutes. See note 17 supra.
51. See Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 35 F. Supp.
573, 575 (W. D. Tex. 1940), rev'd, 311 U. S. 570 (1941) ; KE NiTzER, supra note 1, at
106. The argument naturally has great political appeal: low-cost producers are not un-
willing to boost their own prices.
52. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Cominerce on H. R. 290 and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 1802.
53. In the East Texas field, for example, they comprise less than 1% of the total.
See Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 35 F. Supp. 573,
574 (W. D. Tex. 1940), rezld, 311 U. S. 570 (1941).
54. There is some authority for the view that wells temporarily shut in will re-
establish themselves. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Intcrstate
and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 290 and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 738.
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ground and can be recovered when price, by the unregulated operation of
the forces of supply and demand, rises to a level which indemnifies costs
of production.55 It is the law of progress that the high-cost producer be
driven to the wall. If principles of humanity, or even of conservation, require
that he be continued in operation, the only economical method is direct
government subsidy to the one affected, not maintenance of an artificially
high price level which indirectly subsidizes those producers who by the
fortune of nature have relatively low costs of production.
The contention that use value is conserved by restricting production and
maintaining a high price level is epitomized in the criticism of the industry
for producing for the satisfaction of wants which could be satisfied by com-
paratively low-priced resources. According to this argument, when the price
of oil falls to the level of the price of coal, crude which could be saved for
the future production of gasoline will be used fur fuel. 0 But carrying the
argument to its logical conclusion, domestic crude production would be cur-
tailed whenever a cheaper substitute was available. Imports of foreign oil
would therefore be encouraged. Yet the prorationists have insisted upon a
high protective tariff upon foreign oil. This inconsistency aside, it is basically
dangerous to toy with estimates of future wants. While the present genera-
tion may owe certain obligations to future generations, it should not be
burdened by the enforced non-use of oil on the hazard that this oil might be
economically more significant at a later date, when it can now be employed
to yield more than its cost of production under proper methods of recovery.
Restriction of the rate of production will maximize the ultimate recovery
of oil from a field, as the prorationists contend, if, and only if, it is admin-
istered with that end precisely in view. There exists an efficient rate of
production for each field and for each well in the field. If any one of these
rates is varied either above or below its efficient percentage, maxinum
recovery will be reduced.57 Yet under the present methods of determining
states' allowables, no consideration is given to the efficient rates of produc-
tion of the various 'pools in the states. s Nor, in the distribution of the
allowables, is any account taken of the varying characteristics of different
pools. Likewise pool allocations are prorated among the wells in the field
largely on a per well basis without regard to excessive drilling, oil-gas ratios,
55. The best example of secondary recovery is found in the Pennsylvania oil fields.
Abandoned wells were given a new lease on life by the application of different pruduc-
tion methods. See Hearings before a Subconinitlce of the Cominnttce on Interstate and
Foreiga Commerce on- H. R. 290 and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 111.
56. As might be expected this argument has been fostered mainly by coal mine oper-
ators who fear crude oil competition. See PE=ENGIU., op. cit. stpra note 3, at 99-106.
57. It is not often realized that a pool can be damaged by a too restricted rate of
flow as well as by a too liberal rate. See WATxixs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 14, n. 14.
58. Moreover, the allowables once determined become stereotyped without regard to
increases or decreases in productive efficiency. See id. at 110.
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and the location of wells on the geological structure. Such an indiscriminate
curtailment of production can only result in damaging wells and reducing
the recovery obtainable under a program of scientific control. If ultimate
recovery is intreased at all, it is only because of a fortuitous circumstance
that any restriction is beneficial by comparison with uncontrolled flow. But
proration itself embodies no considered policy to conserve reservoir energy,
Storage of oil, it can be agreed with the proponents of proration, causes
both economic and physical waste. It is costly to erect and maintain storage
facilities and, once in storage, oil may be lost by fire or evaporation." But
the contention that storage is inevitable when no curb is placed on produc-
tion requires close scrutiny. Ordinarily in the economic system there is
always a demand at some price. The demand for crude is created by refiners.
If, then, refiners store the oil, two alternative reasons may be assigned:
either they expect a rise in the price of crude or they desire to prevent a
fall in gasoline prices. On the other hand, if the oil is stored by its pro-
ducer, he may himself be speculating on a rise in the price of crude or lie
may be unable to sell to refiners at any price. Most of the storage capacity
of the country has been owned by refineries'and pipe line companies. In
the past enormous stocks of crude were accumulated in anticipation of a
shortage of oil.G0 When so motivated it seems highly doubtful that storage
raises any question of conservation. Speculation is generally believed to aid
economic processes in achieving the maximum utilization of resources. But
recently, from the time when an adequate supply of crude became definitely
assured, storage has tended to develop more from a lack of demand for
crude and from a desire to preserve the gasoline price structure than from
speculative hoarding. This practice does constitute needless waste. The total
loss, however, is slight when compared with total production.0 ' Certainly
it does not alone justify such an artificially high price level as the proration
mechanism has effected. 62 More important, its underlying cause is a mono-
polistic condition on the demand side of the crude oil market. Remedial
efforts should thus be directed to the demand factor 6f the price equation
rather than to the supply variable.
The monopolistic character of the demand for crude goes far to explain
the entire system of proration control. Refineries create the demand. And
the early monopoly of refineries, achieved by the first Standard Oil Company,
59. It has been estimated that the cost of erecting storage tanks is $.50 per barrel
of capacity and the cost of storing oil about $.35 per barrel per year. See LOGAN, op. Cit.
supra note 1, at 102. Losses from evaporation today approximate 1.5%. See SItIMAN,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 121.
60. The shortage failed to materialize. See KE-ANITZEI, op. cit. supra note 1, at 52.
61. See S HU.A, op. cit. supra note 1, at 121.
62. See Danciger Oil and Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 49 S. W.
(2d) 837, 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), rei'd on other grounds, 122 Tex. 243, 56 S. W.
(2d) 1075 (1933).
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still has virility despite numerous judicial dissolution decrees.6" The clise
ownership of essential refining patents today assures a concentrated contro .l
of refineries.64 As formerly, the price of crude is posted by one of the
major oil companies in each of the large oil fields and that price is usually
followed by the other oil companies." The price is determined by the
value of crude at the refinery less transportation costs.0C Prior to the advent
of proration, it was entirely unrelated to the costs of producing the crude.
But proration, by a rigid limitation of production, has inaugurated a nit-ore
favorable balance between costs and price. The posted price now approxi-
mates the well costs of the highest cost producers.67
Even more significant to the producer than the posted price has been the
control of pipe lines exercised by the large integrated refiners. 3 The Supreme
Court in 1920 recognized monopolization of transportation facilities as an
effective method of controlling the production of any commodity. 9 Pipe
lines are the only practical means of transporting crude oil.-O Since each
field usually has only one pipe line as an outlet, 71 there is an absence of
competition not only between pipe lines and other forms of transportation,
but also among pipe lines themselves.72 Faced with this situation before the
establishment of proration, oil producers were forced to sell to the integrated
refiner unless some independent refiner located in the field. It was not
feasible to ship to an independent refiner located along the route of the
63. See Hale, Trust Dissolution: "Atonniring" Business Units of Monopolislic Si -e
(1940) 40 CoL L. REv. 615 passim; SwTocmnc, op. cit. supra note 1, at 49.
64. See HA lTo-, PRICE AND PRICE POLIY (11938) 143. In 1937, 93.7%i total
refining was done by the 20 largest refiners in the country. See Pvit ;, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 4.
65. See Hearings before the Temporary National Economic e t nomnittce on Pliic
Res. 113, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939) 9707, 9943-45.
66. See ibid. Oil is customarily bought at the well by the refiner and he provid5
for its transportation to his plant.
67. The posted price is still determined by the value of the crude t, the refiner les-
transportation cost, but that figure now approaches a coverage of well costs.
68. It has been recently estimated that the major oil compani¢ control 92't of the
crude pipe line mileage. See Black, Oil Pipe Line Dirorce,,nt by% Litigation and Legis-
lation (1940) 25 CORN. L. Q. 510, 512. See also PoGUr, op. cit. supra note 1, at 32.
69. See United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26, 48 (1920).
70. One estimate states that the ton-mile cost of trmnspurtation of crude by rail is
8.3 mills, by pipe line 3.2 mills, and by tanker 125 mills. See Snu.':., op. cit. supra
note 1, at 100. See also Hearings bcfore the Temnporary N~ational E-conomic Couniftce
on Public Res. 113, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939) 71S0. Although water transportation is
cheapest, it is not available to all and usually requires a pipe line as intermediary. For the
year 1937, 71% of the crude oil received at refineries in the United States arrived by
pipe line, 26% by boat, and 3% by tank car and truck. See Petroleum Rail Shippers'
Ass'n v. Alton & So. Railroad, 243 I. C. C. 539, 599 (1941).
71. See FEDERAL TRADE ComiussixON, PETROLEUM.4 I.musmV : Ppu s, Pi0oFirs, am
Co~nErTo.N (1928) 99.
72. See Reduced Pine Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 L C. C. 115, 143
(1940).
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pipe line because, even though pipe lines had been declared common car-
riers, 73 they either refused to carry ratably where their capacity was fully
utilized or they charged prohibitive rates. 74  Common purchaser statutes,
enacted in an endeavor to enforce ratable taking, were held invalid.10 Pro-
ration was historically devised to accomplish the aim of the common pur-
chaser statutes ;7 it has since been proved admirably fitted to achieve that
end. By restricting and allocating output each refiner is today required to
buy ratably from all wells if he is to secure his requisite supply. 7
Under the proration scheme, however, non-affiliates still rarely attempt
to use pipeline facilities because of the exorbitant rates charged by pipeline
companies. Although the rates of the interstate pipe lines are subject to
regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission,78 there has in fact been
no adequate supervision.7" On the one band, pipeline proceedings require
an enormous expenditure of time and capital. On the other hand, the
Interstate Commerce Commission has had its administrative capacity fully
taxed by railroad problems.80 Yet excessive rates subsidize the integrated
73. Interstate pipe lines were declared common carriers and subjected to the super-
vision of the Interstate Commerce Commission by the Hepburn Act. See 34 STAT. 534
(1906), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (1940) ; The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548 (1914).
74. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce on H. R. 290 and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 1415.
75. Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 59 F. (2d) 750 (W.
D. Tex. 1932); cf. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55 (1937).
76. One primary purpose of proration was to prevent the refiners from buying only
from the wells in which they held interests. See Hearings before a Subcotmmittce of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 290 and H. R. 7372, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1939) 1416.
77. Caution dictates one qualification. Proration has definitely succeeded in secur-
ing ratable taking from wells in a particular pool. Champlin Refining Co. v. Railroad
Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210 (1932). But its efficacy in requiring ratable
taking from different pools is questioned by the decision in Thompson v. Consolidated Gas
Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55 (1937) ; but cf. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan &
Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1939), amended, 311 U. S. 614 (1940) ; id., 311 U. S.
570 (1941) ; Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U. S. 376 (1939). The Patterson
and Rowan and Nichols cases suggest that no due process issue call be henceforth raised
in this situation. Furthermore, Bay Petroleum Corp. v. Corporation Commission of Kan-
sas, 36 F. Supp. 66 (D. Kan. 1940), demonstrates how easily the Thompson case can be
avoided by simply tying ratable taking up with some waste preventive measure.
78. See note 73 supra.
79. The same is true of intrastate pipelines. See Comment (1940) 35 ILL. L. Rmtv.
175, 191.
80. The difficulties involved are suggested by a recent pipe-line rate case which the
Interstate Commerce Commission had under consideration for more than five years be-
fore it decided to reduce rates and minimum tender requirements. Reduced Pipe Line
Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I. C. C. 115 (1940). Often where rates lave been
patently exorbitant no complaints have been registered with the Interstate Commerce
Commission for the reason that no small producer has sufficient resources to continue
the prosecution. See id. at 138.
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refiner at the expense of independent refiners. If an independent refiner
buys oil at the field, as is customary, he must pay pipeline rates; his com-
petitor, the integrated refiner, ultimately pays only transportation costs,
receiving a rebate of the difference between these costs and the pipe line
rates through intercorporate settlements. It is also a common practice for
pipeline companies to require a minimum tender of crude from each shipper
as a condition precedent to acceptance of any oil for transportation.81 By
these devices the monopoly on the demand side of the crude oil market has
been perpetuated.,
2
Existence of monopolistic restraints in the demand for oil does not, ho,-
ever, justify the. unreasonable stabilization of prices achieved by proration.
Designed to protect the highest cost producer, the level at which price is
pegged is prima facie uneconomical. Conservation arguments advanced in
its support contain on analysis more shadow than substance. Restriction of
production and price stabilization is not needed to keep stripper wells in
operation. Nor does the possibility of eliminating slight storage losses justify
such measures. Maximum utilization of reservoir energy is not promoted
by any of the proration formulas now in use, and any increase in use value
is entirely speculative. But both federal and state courts have been per-
suaded by the pseudo-conservation arguments.83 With no clear conception
of the objects and methods of conservation, they have visualized only one
set of alternatives, proration or unregulated production; upon an elaborate
display of conflicting technical evidence, they have concluded that proration
is a reasonable method of control by comparison with unregulated produc-
tion. But regardless of the relative advantages or demerits of unregulated
production and of proration, both methods are unreasonable from an economic
as well as a conservation standpoint. The courts, however, lack the con-
stitutional power to remedy the situation. The duty then falls upon the
legislature to adopt a program of scientific control.
81. See id. at 133; Petroleum Rail Shippers Ass'n v. Alton & So. Railroad, 243 1. C.
C. 589, 656 (1941).
82. Unvittingly proration has strengthened the demand monopoly. Refiners' profits
are protected by restricting supply to consumptive demand for refined products. See
Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 5 F. Supp. 633, 637, n. 1 (E.
D. Tex. 1934); Bay Petroleum Corp. v. Corporation Commission of Kansas, 36 F. Supp.
66, 72 (D. Kan. 1940) (dissent). The temptation to refiners to compete, caused by an
oversupply of crude, is removed. Control of the gasoline marketing price structure is
aided by restricting production of crude to purchasers' nominations.
83. For examples, see Champlin Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission of Oklahoma,
286 U. S. 210 (1932); Bay Petroleun Corp. v. Corporation Commission of Kansas, 36
F. Supp. 66 (D. Kan. 1940); Danciger Oil & Refining Co. v. railroad Commission 41f
Texas, 49 S. W. (2d) 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), rev'd on other grounds, 122 Tex. 243,
56 S. W. (2d) 1075 (1933); Sterling Refining Co. v. Walker, 165 Okla. 45, 25 Pac.
(2d) 312 (1933).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
UNIT OPERATION AND CONSERVATION
Unit operation of oil fields has long been advocated in the United States
as a proven method for promoting both conservation and economic stabiliza-
tion in petroleum production.8 4 Unit operation refers to the process of
developing and operating a pool in the interest of maximum ultimate recovery
through the medium of a single management and control. Since most oil
fields in the country are divided among a multitude of private ownerships,
as a practical matter of administration unit operation requires a prior
merging or unitization of these diverse interests into a common ownership.
By one method of unitization, holders of tracts exchange their claims for
undivided interests in the entire field. Each owner then shares the expenses
and benefits of production according to his assigned proportion of the under-
lying oil. Although the problem encountered by a state conservation agency
in distributing a fair share of the state's allowable production to each well
owner is not obviated by unit operation, advancing technical knowledge can
be expected to secure an accurate measurement of the volume of an oil pool
underlying individual tracts, 8 5 on which an equitable distribution of the
benefits and burdens of unit operation may be based.
The full advantages of unit operation, once launched, can only be com-
prehended in the light of an accurate definition of conservation. Conserva-
tion is directed toward better economy through superior efficiency.80 Efficiency
denotes the ratio of energy output to energy input; economy the ratio of
money output to money input. Waste, which is the antithesis of conserva-
tion, results when efficiency can be increased without reducing economy.
To illustrate by the simplest case of a closely drilled pool operated at a
proper oil-gas rate as compared with a flush rate under the rule of capture:
Energy input and money input are constant. When the pool is exploited
at a proper oil-gas rate, energy output is greater than that resulting from
production at a flush rate since ultimate recovery is increased. With effi-
ciency of operation thus raised, money output becomes greater and economy
is advanced. s7 Comparing proration and unit operation as alternative con-
servation methods for pools being exploited under the rule of capture:
Because of a disregard for the optimal rates of production of a specified
field and of wells in the specified field, energy output under proration would
84. See German, Compulsory Unit Operation of Oil Pools (1932) 20 CALIF. L. Rvv.
111; MID-CONTINENT OIL & GAS ASS'N, HANDBOOK ON UNITIZATION OF Ol, POOLS
(1930).
85. See Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296, 306, 83 S. W. (2d) 935,
940 (1935), rehearing, 87 S. W. (2d) 1069 (Tex. 1935).
86. See WATKiNS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 31; NATIONAL RESOuRCES COMMITTEE,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 186.
87. Unit operation may postpone enjoyment of oil output to some extent, but the
value of tile ultimate recovery is increased many times over the discounted value of the
postponed production.
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not necessarily be increased. Economy, it is true, might be advanced under
a proration system- but only by the artificial pegging of the price level
without reference to the efficiency of production. If the price of crude fell
below-the costs of operating the wells in a particular pool, proration agencies
would resolve the problem by restricting the permissible production of all
other wells in the state until price rose to cover the costs of operating the wells
in the least favorably situated pool. Conversely, proration would fail entirely
to provide for the situation where a shortage of supply developed, and the
price of crude soared. judged by present policy, production would be ex-
panded without reference to maximum utilization of the reservoir energy
of a pool. On the other hand, under unit operation pools would always be
operated at the maximum efficiency consistent with the best possible economy
in production. If a shortage of crude should develop, purchasers who offered
the highest price would receive the available supply under the theory that
competitive price would insure the best distribution of resources. By the
easy expedient of an excess profits tax, producers could be prevented from
reaping unearned rewards. Conversely, if price fell below the costs of
operating a particular pool under unit operation, that pool would be forced
to shut down temporarily or permanentlyss Unit operation in effect would
reinstate the automatic operation of the laws of supply and demand. Com-
petition would operate among pools rather than among wells or among states,
and only the most efficient and economical pools would survive.
To this there is one qualification. A condition of free competition on
the demand side has been implicitly assumed. Under the present control of
pipe lines by refiners, discrimination in transportation cost would cause
aberrations in the economy ratio which might operate to keep the high-cost
producer in existence and remove his otherwise low-cost competitur. Some
progress in weakening the demand monopoly was made by a recent consent
judgment of a federal district court against most of the major oil companies
and pipeline carriers, enjoining the payment of exorbitant rebates by carriers
to stockholding shipper-owners under the guise of dividends.89 But divi-
dends to the extent of 7% on the valuation of a carrier's property were
permitted. A substantial discrimination in transportation cost is thus still
possible, albeit in the form of a return on invested capital. Hence if a
program of unit operations were adopted in the immediate future, full realiza-
tion of its benefits could only be assured by the complete divorcement of
pipelines from refineries. 0 In view.of the stickiness of posted prices perhaps
a second step might also be required if divorcement of the pipelines failed
88. Unit operation eliminates the rule of capture and thus permits dlisontinuance 4d
production when price fails to cover operating cost.
89. United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 10 U. S. L. W'Eax 2403 (U. S. Dist. Ct.
D. C. 1941).
Wo. For available methods of pipe-line divorcement, see Black, toe. cit. supra iute URS.
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to increase competition among refiners: a governmental agency might be
established to fix maximum and minimum prices for crude oil.
As to the immediate and practical problem of how unitization can best
be effectuated, it would seem that Congress must enact the necessary legis-
lation. It is generally conceded that such interference by the Federal Govern-
ment in activities conducted within the states would be valid under the
interstate commerce clause, the war power, or the taxing power.0 1 Certainly
the states cannot be expected to adopt the requisite uniform legislation in
view of their diverse competitive interests.
9 2
The most persistent objection to unit operation has been voiced by the
small producers, who fear that the major oil companies would control policy
under such a program. Adequate administrative provision should be made
to protect the independents. But the trend of judicial decisions indicates
that there could be no successful claim of a deprivation of property under
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. Although a property right in underground oil was recognized in
Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana,"3 it has been held subject to two definite
restrictions in the case of state regulations tested under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) those designed to eliminate
waste; and (2) those designed to protect correlative rights. 4 Unit operation
envisages both sets of limitations. Moreover the Supreme Court of the
United States in the recent cases of Railroad Commission of Texas Y. Rowan
& Nichols Oil Company 5 and Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Companyo0
implied that no due process question was presented by state regulations of
crude production.9 7 In effect the Court overruled the cases of Champlin
Refining Company v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma 8 and Thompson
91. See Ford, supra note 1, at 1212. The probable validity of federal regulation of
oil production under the commerce clause is strongly suggested by United States v.
Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533 (1939). In that case Congress was held
to have the power to regulate the price of milk sold by a local dairy farmer in aid of a
general plan to protect interstate commerce from the burdens of low prices arising front
excessive surpluses.
92. See NATIONAL RFsoURCES COWI=.[rTTE, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 215.
93. 177 U. S. 190 (1900).
94. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 (1911) ; Walls v. Midland
Carbon Co., 254 U. S. 300 (1920) ; Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U. S.
8 (1931); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U. S.
210 (1932).
95. 310 U. S. 573 (1939), amended, 311 U.'S. 614 (1940).
96. 305 U. S. 376 (1939).
97. See Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 680. Compare Summers, Does the Regulation
of Oil Production Require the Denial of Due Process and the Equal Protection of the
Laws? (1940) 19 TEx. L. Rav. 1, The Rowan & Nichols Cases (1941) 13 Miss. L.
J. 417, with Davis, Judicial Enzasculation of Administrative Action and Oil Proration:
Another View (1940) 19 Tzx. L. REV. 29.
98. 286 U. S. 210 (1932).
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v. Consolidated Gas Company90 insofar as they recognized property rights
in underground oil which would be protected by the due process clause
against policing regulations designed neither to prevent waste nor to insure
correlative rights.
To date the only serious attempt at federal regulation is represented by
the Cole Bill.'00 It is specifically directed only to the elimination of physical
waste and does not purport to cover the problem of economic waste from
overproduction; nor does it contain provisions adequate to cope with that
problem. Two devices are proposed for the elimination of avoidable physical
waste (as defined in the bill): (1) voluntary cooperation among producers
with the approval of the federal administrator of the act ;101 and (2) recom-
mendations by the federal administrator to the state conservation commis-
sions, followed up by effective enforcement orders in case the recommenda-
tions are not adopted.10 2 Although the former provision does contain the
seed of voluntary unitization, the bill as a whole does not answer the urgent
need of the nation for enforced conservation of its crude oil resources.
THE WAR EFFORT
Immediate action is rendered imperative by the current war emergency.
The necessity of securing the greatest possible recovery of oil from the fields
of the United States becomes daily more evident as the defense require-
ments for airplanes, tanks, and trucks increase by leaps and bounds' 03 at
the same time that fields in other parts of the world are being isolated'0° or
destroyed.' 0 5 Proration to date has proved itself inadequate as a method
for maximizing recovery. Designed solely to prevent overproduction, it
would be even less effectual to prevent a wasteful exploitation of oil fields
in the situation of a rampant demand. 00 Relieved of the nemesis of over-
production, states and producers would no longer be motivated to adhere
99. 30a U. S. 55 (1937).
100. For text of the Cole Bill, see H. R. 7372, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
101. Id. at § 7.
102. Id. at § 6.
103. It is estimated that the requirements of the fighting forces of the United States
for 1942 will be double those of 1941. No figures are available for the oil products to
be shipped to other nations under lend-lease arrangements. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 2,
1942, p. 41, col. 1.
104. The increasing loss of tankers by enemy torpedoes must rapidly give rise to a
shortage of shipping facilities. For estimates of losses and uf new constructions, see (1942)
40 OL AND GAs JOURNAL, No. 38, p. 106.
105. Rich oil fields in the Far East were recently dynamited by the British and the
Dutch. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1941, p. 1, col. 5; id. Jan. 12, 1942, p. 1, coL 8; id.
Jan. 14, 1942, p. 1, cols. 5 and 6. At present there is a grave danger that the entire
Far East oil reserve will be captured by v ar enemies of the United States. See N. Y.
Times, Feb. 16, 1942, p. 1, col. 7.
106. See Ely, supra note 1, at 1240.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
to specified quotas. The rest of the industry would be ready for an increase
in production. Three new pipelines have been built within the last year 1" 7
and refiners are increasingly impatient to utilize large excess capacities.108
The possibility exists that production would again be carried on under the
stimulus of the rule of capture in direct violation of conservation practices.
Unregulated production could probably supply both private and govern-
mental needs in the short run without stint - but at the expense of ultimate
maximum recovery of oil. The country, however, can hardly count on an
early termination of the war. In the interest of national defense, therefore,
if not in the interest of conservation, the Federal Government must enforce
a long-run policy in oil production. The time is most auspicious for an
exercise of its war powers' 0 to initiate a program of unit operation of oil
fields. Not only would the ultimate recovery of oil be maximized by such
a program'1 0 but through unitization the producers themselves would be
protected against the certainty of a competitive overexpansion' during the
war and the possibility of an ensuing deflation after the stimulus of defense
demands subsides.
107. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1942, p. 41, col. 2.
108. See STOCKING, op. cit. supra note 1, at 263.
109. Professor Pound, of the Harvard Law School, and Professor Bates, of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School, have both expressed the opinion that the war powers
of the President and Congress may be exercised to conserve oil and gas. See Hearing
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on I-1. R.
441, 73d Cong., Recess (1934) 1557-74.
110. Immediately available production might be reduced, but any curtailing effect on
the defense effort could be avoided by a rationing of the private consumption of refined
products.
111. It is true that the drilling of new wells will be curtailed because of govern-
mental priorities on essential materials. Producers have already been forbidden to drill
new wells without the authorization of the Director of Priorities, except, and this is sig-
nificant on the need for unit operation of oil fields, where the wells are required for a
specified drilling pattern. See (1941) 10 U. S. L. WEEK 2397; (1942) 10 U. S. L. \VEEK
2448. But even with this limitation, competitive overexpansion can still develop through
a more intense exploitation of existing wells.
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